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THE CONTRACTS OF MINORS VIEWED FROM THE
PERSPECTIVE OF FAIR EXCHANGE
WALTER D. NAVIN, JR.t

INTRODUCTION

The law expects its teenagers to behave as responsible adults when
questions of criminal or tort liability are involved, but expects them to
behave in a much less responsible fashion when contractual liability is
concerned. Because the law expects young people to be imposed upon,
it gives them the privilege of avoiding their contracts. In fact, how
minors behave contractually is a matter of speculation. Perhaps, their
behavior depends upon how those around them think they will behave-an example of a self-fulfilling prophecy at work. Modern educational theorists apparently are of the view that an adolescent has all the
mental equipment necessary to handle conceptual reasoning at an age
far earlier than anyone expects. Nevertheless, injustice is often visited
on the adult who enters into a contractual arrangement with a minor.

For example, assume that Henry, an enterprising elderly minor,
requires the use of a panel truck in his newspaper-delivery business. He
approaches a truck dealer and selects a handsome blue vehicle that is
certain to impress his customers. The dealer, in an excess of caution,
inquires of his age and whether he might be mentally ill. "No," replies
Henry, "I am perfectly all right, and I am well over the age of eighteen
years."
Henry does appear to be in all respects what he says he is. He is
clean-shaven, well-dressed, and short-haired. The panel-truck transaction is in no way unreasonable, either from the dealer's point of view
or from Henry's, so the dealer sells the truck to Henry. Henry pays onethird of the cost in cash and finances the remaining two-thirds with. the
usual negotiable promissory note and security device, which the dealer
promptly discounts to a local bank. The bank is in all respects a holder
2
in due course.
tProfessor of Law, University of North Carolina. The author wishes to acknowledge the
contributions of two research assistants, William Maywhort and Brent Neal, to this article, which
was written in cooperation with the North Carolina Law Center.
14 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES Developmental Psychology 14047 (1968).
2
That is, it meets the test of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-302 (1965).
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And now assume that as Henry drives away from the dealer's place
of business, he violates the state's reckless driving statute and, as a result
thereof, is involved in a two-car collision in which the panel truck is
demolished and two persons are severely injured. As the law applies
today, Henry has clearly violated a criminal statute and is liable for the
injuries caused by his negligence. He has, in short, committed both a
crime3 and a tort.4 But if Henry is indeed a minor (in North Carolina
a person who has not yet reached the age of eighteen), he may recover
his down payment and successfully avoid liability on his promises to pay
any balance-even as against a holder in due course-simply by returning to the dealer the mass of twisted metal that now represents the panel
truck. The contracts of minors are voidable at their option.'
On the other hand, if Henry were nineteen but mentally
ill-suffering, let us say, from "delusions of grandeur"-he could not
recover the down payment, and his legal liability to pay the balance
clearly would be fixed. The contracts of the mentally ill, in the absence
of notice of the illness to the other party, may be enforceable if they
are fair and reasonable.' Moreover, the defense of mental illness is not
valid against a holder in due course.7
A

SUGGESTED APPROACH

It is the purpose of this article to explore the ramifications of these
diverse results in terms of contractual liability. The hypothesis of this
article is that perhaps the time has come to treat the incapacity of
minors in a manner similar to the incapacity of the mentally ill so as to
redress the severe consequences visited upon the adult who has entered
into a contractual relationship with a minor. Indeed, courts have attempted to achieve such a result through the use of fictions, and their
experience with the contractual liability of the mentally ill bodes well
for the application of a similar rule to the contracts of minors. Incapacity should be a device for controlling imposition on those persons who
actually are imposed upon rather than an arbitrary rule that cuts hard
and harsh and, at least upon occasion, turns upon something as irrelevant as chronology. It is not that some minors do not need protection
'Cf. State v. Hill, 276 N.C. 1, 170 S.E.2d 885 (1969).
4
Welch v. Jenkins, 271 N.C. 138, 155 S.E.2d 763 (1967).
'Fisher v. Taylor Motor Co., 249 N.C. 617, 107 S.E.2d 94 (1959).
'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18C(2) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964).
7
Sprinkle v. Welborn, 140 N.C. 163, 52 S.E. 666 (1908).

19721

CONTRACTS OF MINORS

from imposition; they obviously do. But many persons who happen not
to be fortuitously able to argue minority are likwise imposed upon. And,
of course, the converse is also true; many minors who enter into reasonable contractual arrangements and who have not been imposed upon in
any fashion should bear contractual liability.
CAPACITY'S POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Within the rubrics of contract law these matters are gathered under
the heading of capacity to contract.' As is so often the case, such a large
concept embraces many overlapping and sometimes inconsistent implications of policy. The mentally incompetent's contract may be attacked
for lack of capacity, but in most instances the result turns upon the
reasonableness of his manifestation to the other party'-an approach
often used to illustrate the policy of objective mutual assent.
Older cases commonly spoke of the act of the incompetent as being
absolutely void.'" In the days when contractual liability was perceived
in terms of subjective meeting of the minds, this conclusion seemed to
follow naturally. Moreover, it may have been that the law courts, lacking the equitable power to restore or to reconvey, could only protect the
incompetent by declaring his act absolutely void." In any event, the
modern cases speak of the act of the incompetent not as void but rather
as voidable at the incompetent's option, and then only under certain
circumstances later described. The policy of protecting the expectations
and reliance raised by objectively viewed acts is thus supported.
On the other hand, the incompetent who has had a guardian appointed for him has no capacity to contract, although in fact he may be
perfectly able to form the requisite mental assent. The policy here disregards reasonable expectations protected by the objective theory of assent and, instead, paramounts certainty of transactions concerning valu2
able property of the ward and the conservation of the ward's assets.'
The contracts of infants are also voidable because of the infant's

18 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964); RESTATEMENT OF
18 (1932).
'Wadford v. Gillette 193 N.C. 413, 137 S.E. 314 (1927).
"Joiner v. Southern Land Sales Corp., 158 Ga. 752, 124 S.E. 518 (1924); Daniel v. Dixon,
161 N.C. 377, 77 S.E. 305 (1913).
"ALLEN, FERSTER, & WEIHOFEN, MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 276
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §

CONTRACTS §

(1968).
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18A & Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964).
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lack of capacity.1 3 But again the reason seems not to be that a minor
cannot in fact form the requisite mental assent. Rather, it is that minors
can be imposed upon more easily than others and that to protect them
the law must shelter them-all of them-from such consequences. The
trouble is, however, that the shelter shelters them too much.
CAPACITY AND THE NORTH CAROLINA MINOR

The North Carolina case of Greensboro Morris Plan Co. v.
Palmer" illustrates how far the arbitrary application of the
chronological-age rule of capacity carries a good court from justice. A
nineteen-year-old married, emancipated minor bought a truck on credit
for use in his business. The cost of the truck was more than three
thousand dollars. Profits from the use of the truck enabled the minor
to pay more than two thousand dollars of the debt, but upon his eventual
default the seller and the finance company found it necessary to repossess the truck and sell it at auction, where it brought seven hundred
dollars. They then sued the minor for the balance due, which by their
calculations came to 1,308 dollars. When the minor disclosed his defense, the seller and the finance company amended their pleadings to
assert a cause of action sounding in false representation and deceit for
the same amount. Three of the five justices affirmed the trial judge's
decision that the minor could avoid the contract, recover the two thousand dollars paid, and not be held accountable for his tort of misrepresentation.
In so holding, the supreme court aligned North Carolina with those
states that have held that a minor's intentional misrepresentation of his
age has no effect on the incapacity rule. The minor not only avoided
liability on that portion of his undertaking that he had not yet performed but also recovered more than two thousand dollars that he had
paid on the debt. All that the dealer and finance company received as a
result of the transaction was seven hundred dollars. The minor had the
use of the truck without cost for at least six months and the benefit of
the profits that he had made during that time.
Nevertheless, this is to make no brief for the finance company and
the dealer, since the contract undoubtedly had plenty of fat in it by way
of substantial interest charges, time-finance charges, and the like. But
sharp practice inflicted upon a deceitful minor ought to add up to
"3Fisher v. Taylor Motor Co., 249 N.C. 617, 107 S.E.2d 94 (1959).
"185 N.C. 108, 115 S.E. 822 (1923).
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zero-not two thousand dollars for the minor!
If the court had applied the principle advocated in this article to
the facts of Palmer, it could have treated the matter in equitable terms
to the extent that the contract had been performed. That is to say, the
court could have refused to permit the minor to exercise his privilege
to the extent of actual performance and yet permitted avoidance as to
the executory portion of the transaction. One could argue further that
the minor ought to be held accountable in damages for his intentional
misrepresentation. However, it should be sufficient to restore the parties
as nearly as possible to the status quo ante.
Earlier cases in North Carolina support the majority's decision in
Palmer.The plaintiffs in that case asserted the misrepresentation as an
affirmative cause of action, but the minor's misrepresentation of his age
in a contractual transaction may also be viewed as a defensive matter-an act that should estop him from asserting the truth that he is a
minor. That an infant who has misrepresented his age cannot be estopped to assert this defense was established in CarolinaInterstate &
Loan Ass'n v. Black. 5 There a minor had executed a note and a mortgage. Subsequently, a foreclosure action was met with the defense of
infancy, and the reply was that the minor was estopped to assert such a
defense by her representation of full age. In holding that no estoppel
could be asserted, the court used colorful language in support of the
policy of the arbitrary rule:
If the courts should sanction this doctrine [estoppel], the result would
be that the ancient rule, established as a safeguard to protect infants
from the wiles of designing rascals, would be abrogated, and the way
opened up to reckless youths to evade the law by lying. The courts
would thereby put a premium upon falsehood and hold out the temptation to infants and to others, who hope to profit by debauching them,
to resort to this disreputable method of enabling the one to squander
and the other to extort the patrimony intended to prepare a child for
16
future usefulness.
Colorful indeed, but the result is that the knowing minor can still
lie about his age, drive the car over a cliff, recover his down payment,
and go his legal merry way. Fisherv. Taylor Motor Co.17 illustrates this
fact by holding that an infant is under no duty to account for the use
15119

N.C. 323, 25 S.E. 975 (1896).
at 329, 25 S.E. at 976.
1"249 N.C. 617, 107 S.E.2d 94 (1959).

'Id.
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value of goods in his possession under the contract of sale. In Fishera
minor represented that he was of full age (at least, according to the
dealer's pleadings) and bought a car with a down payment, a promissory
note, and a security device. Following a wreck that reduced the value
of the new car to approximately fifty dollars, the minor brought an
action to recover his down payment. In holding for the minor, the court
observed that the diminution of the value of the car as a result of the
wreck was the "'very improvidence against which the law seeks to
protect him.' ",i8Of course, the minor in possession of anything of value
that but for the contract would have been the adult's must return it to
the adult. The legal effect of the minor's avoidance of the contract for
the purchase of the personalty is to revest title in the seller. 9
Another North Carolina case involving the estoppel argument deserves brief attention. In McCormick v. Crotts2" McCormick sold
Crotts a motion picture projection machine and snaplight lens for use
in the Garden Theater in Biscoe, North Carolina. Crotts bought on
credit, and later McCormick found it necessary to sue on the promissory note and to foreclose the security instrument that had accompanied
the transaction. Crotts filed an answer in which he asserted as a defense
that the machine was defective. Nearly twenty months later but prior
to trial, Crotts amended his answer to include a defense of infancy and
asked that a guardian ad litem be appointed for him. The guardian then
tendered back the equipment and demanded a return of the money paid.
The trial judge, however, held for the seller, accepting the argument that
because Crotts did not assert the defense of infancy in his initial pleading, he was estopped to raise it later. The supreme court reversed for
the obvious reason that if the buyer lacked the capacity to contract, his
act of filing an answer was subject to the same objection.
GASTONIA PERSONNEL CORPORATION V. ROGERS AND THE COMMON

LAW

For those who enjoy that many-faceted puzzle that common law
opinions sometimes produce, the recent case of Gastonia Personnel
Corp. v. Rogers2' is a treasure. A nineteen-year-old married student,
about to become a father, decided that he should abandon his schooling
Isld. at 620, 107 S.E.2d at 97, quoting Collins v. Norfleet-Baggs, Inc., 197 N.C. 659, 660.
150 S.E. 177, 178 (1929).
"Poe v. Home, 44 N.C. 398 (1853).
1198 N.C. 664, 153 S.E. 152 (1930).
21276 N.C. 279, 172 S.E.2d 19 (1970).
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and seek employment. He entered into an agreement with an employment agency, the terms of which included a promise to pay the agency
295 dollars if, as a result of a lead furnished by the agency, he obtained
employment as a draftsman. He did gain such employment as a result
of a lead furnished by the agency, but when it came time to pay he
refused, valuing his economic credit and reputation for integrity, as Mr.
Justice Lake was to put it in his dissenting opinion, "at something less
than $295. ' ' 22 The trial court, applying the common law rule that a
minor's contract is voidable at his option, gave judgment to the minor
on his defense of infancy. The nonsuit was subsequently upheld by the
appellate division.2 The supreme court reversed in a sparkling modern
example of common law intricacy and wisdom. If the contract with the
employment agency were for a necessity, the plaintiff should have gotten
to the jury, at least on the question of reasonable value. In what seems
to be an obvious attempt to rectify the imbalance between the adult and
the minor, four of the seven justices classified the nature of the transaction as one for necessaries and returned the case to the trial court.
Plaintiff had indeed offered evidence sufficient to withstand defendant's
motion for a nonsuit.
That this fiction (Mr. Justice Lake's dissent amply and ably disposes of the classification of this particular contract as one for a
necessary 4) achieves a roughly just result when an adult in good faith
deals with an older minor seems only part of the case's gloss. Assume
that the court does in fact decide that something that was not a necessity
before is one now. If it has done that, then it has changed the law. Yet,
where is the power to change law in our society-in the legislature or
in the courts? That question generated several pages of argument in the
opinion.
Finally, what should a sensible judge do when faced with a situation
in which a rule that has been applied with rigor and severity for centuries
to the facts before him creates an obvious injustice? Surely nothing is
revealed to indicate that the employment agency dealt with Rogers on
anything but a good faith basis; apparently, he seemed to be an adult
in every respect. It does no good to talk of returning consideration here;
strong precedent has it that an infant need not compensate the adult for
any benefit conferred if such benefit could not be returned.
"Id. at 292, 172 S.E.2d at 27.
2Gastonia Personnel Corp. v. Rogers, 5 N.C. App. 219, 168 S.E.2d 31 (1969).
21276 N.C. at 288, 172 S.E.2d at 25.
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CONCEPT AND FAIRNESS

Rough justice between the adult and the minor who have contracted with one another has sometimes been achieved through the utilization of the concept of necessaries. Its rationale is said to be that of
aiding the minor. If his credit were not available for the purchase of
foodstuffs, then the privilege that he has of avoiding his contracts would
actually work against him; he would not be able to buy those items on
credit that he must have in order to exist.
In reading the cases one is struck by the continuing attempt to use
the concept of necessaries to achieve some sort of balance in the exchange. The adult can receive at least the reasonable value of the goods
sold to the minor when they are classified as necessaries, and, conversely, if the deal seems overreaching, the minor is "off the hook" by
a decision that the item is not a necessary, in which case the promise is
not enforceable. In Rogers the majority used the concept to permit an
adult to get to the jury on the question of the reasonable value of the
services rendered. The use of the concept in that case is indicative of
judicial dissatisfaction with the arbitrary application of the privilege of
avoidance given to minors. The strict application of the "necessaries"
rule should have permitted the minor to avoid the contract, and, indeed,
the majority opinion expressly conceded that the lower courts had correctly followed precedent. However, the time had come to change precedent-or so the majority felt.15
Consider now the role of the automobile. Despite the presentation
of factual situations clearly indicating that the minor needed the car in
his work to support himself and his family, the majority rule still holds
that a car cannot be a necessary."6 Perhaps, the reluctance to classify
an automobile as a necessary (and thus give the adult some recovery) is
a reflection of the widespread feeling that automotive merchandising
may not represent an exchange that is foursquare, particularly when one
of the parties to the transaction is a young and inexperienced consumer.
A medical education-valuable though it may be-has been held
not to be a necessary in an opinion that reviews the rich history of this
exception to the rule that permits minors to avoid their contracts."
Moreover, there is at least dictum supporting the proposition that insur2276 N.C. at 286, 172 S.E.2d at 24.
nBancredit, Inc. v. Bethea, 65 N.J. Super. 538, 168 A.2d 250 (App. Div. 1961), Barger v. M.
& J.Finance Corp., 221 N.C. 64, 18 S.E.2d 826 (1942).
"Turner v. Gaither, 83 N.C. 357 (1880).
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ance cannot be classified as a necessary. 2 Finally, a bridal gown for a
young girl has been declared to be a necessary, 9 but timber to build a
home bought by a young minor father has been held not to be a necessary. 0 The judge's reasoning in the latter case is intriguing. If a minor
could be held to a contract to purchase timber for a home, then he could
also be held to pay for the nails, the glass, and the workmen's
wages-for the whole house. And if for the whole house, then for a
wagon, a horse, and soon the exception would destroy the general
rule. " Exactly so, but is this not a fair description of the consequences
of the holding in Rogers!
In this same context some confusion exists about the role of emancipation. In the realm of contractual liability, the concept refers to the
fact that a young man who is living apart from his parents and "on his
own" may find himself legally bound for the reasonable value of the
necessaries that he purchases. 2 If he is still within'the control of his
father or guardian, then he cannot even incur the limited liability that
is affixed to an emancipated minor when he purchases necessaries. 3
Simply stated, this rule is based upon the proposition that no one should
tell a father what to buy for his son. That statement comes from a case
that could be said to have established an exception to the proposition
that a minor living with his father may not incur liability for necessaries. 4 If the minor is seriously injured and requires immediate medical
treatment and the father cannot be reached, the infant may be held
accountable for the reasonable value of the services and treatment that
he receives, especially when he later recovers such a sum from the
3
tortfeasor who injured him. 1
The North Carolina cases mirror the rules that accord great flexibility to this concept of necessaries. The basic question of what is a
necessary is a mixed question of law and fact. 6 The decisions have it
that whether a class of articles can be said to be necessaries is a matter
of law for the judge to determine, but whether a given item within such
a class of articles was actually a necessary for the particular minor is a
2'Pippen v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 130 N.C. 23, 25, 40 S.E. 822, 823 (1902).
"Jordan v. Coffield, 70 N.C. 110 (1874).
3Freeman v. Bridger, 49 N.C. 1 (1856).

11Id. at 3.
"Smith v. Young, 19 N.C. 26 (1836).
"3Britt v. Cook, 34 N.C. 67 (1851).
3'Cole v. Wagner, 197 N.C. 692, 150 S.E. 339 (1929).
"Bitting v. Goss, 203 N.C. 424, 166 S.E. 302 (1932).
"Jordan v. Coffield, 70 N.C. 110, 113 (1874).
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question of fact for the jury to determine.37 Since all of the circumstances surrounding the status of the minor are considered-his station in
life, the nature of the subject matter, and so forth-it is conceivable that
almost anything could be a necessary, given the appropriate status in
the infant.3 It is this device-that the law may accord the label "necessary" to a class of articles-that enabled the court to permit the jury to
determine the reasonable value of the contract to find employment in
Gastonia Personnel Corp. v. Rogers.39 In other words, in reversing the
lower court decision that had upheld the privilege of the minor to avoid
the transaction, the court classified the contract to find employment as
a service that was within the class of necessaries for a minor in the status
of the defendant and, therefore, a jury should rule on the question of
whether in fact this particular service was a necessary for this particular
infant. In so doing, the majority purported to enlarge the common law
definition of a necessary:
In the effort to protect "older minors" from improvident or unfair
contracts, the law should not deny to them the opportunity and right
to obligate themselves for articles of property or services which are
reasonably necessary to enable them to provide for proper support of
themselves and their dependents. The minor should be held liable for
the reasonable value of articles of property or services received pursuant to such a contract.40
In the same opinion the traditional definition of a necessary also
appeared. That definition is quoted here so that the reader may judge
whether the "common law" was changed by the decision in Rogers:
"'An infant may bind himselfe to pay for his necessary meat, drinke,
apparell, necessary physicke, and such other necessaries, and likewise
for his good teaching or instruction, whereby he may profit himselfe
afterwards.' ,,4,
The 1971 North Carolina General Assembly lowered the terminating age of minority to eighteen years.42 However, even at this lower age
there will be many "older minors" who contract, and the utility of the
concept of necessaries as a means of achieving rough justice for the adult
3Id.

l'Turner v. Gaither, 83 N.C. 357 (1880).
-'276 N.C. 279, 172 S.E.2d 19 (1970).
4276 N.C. at 287, 172 S.E.2d at 25.
"Id.
at 281, 172 S.E.2d at 20 (italics omitted). The definition is taken from "Coke on Littleton,
13th ed. (1788), p. 172." Id.
"2N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 48A-1 to -2 (Supp. 1971).
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who deals with such a minor is still available for the judge who wishes

to use it. It remains a fiction, however, and the predictability factor in
any rule utilizing a fiction is obviously very low. Why not acknowledge

that what one may be doing in fact is weighing the exchange in terms
of fairness?
RATIFICATION, DISAFFIRMANCE, AND FAIRNESS

A common posture for a lawsuit involving the contracts or conveyances of minors is one in which an argument is made that the minor,

after reaching his majority, has ratified the transaction or, conversely,
that the minor has disaffirmed the transaction. The question of what

acts amount to a disaffirmance or a ratification is a matter of much
verbiage in the opinions. Distinctions are drawn between mere acknowledgements and express promises,4" between executed and executory

45
contracts," between land transactions and those for personal property,

and between action and inaction.46 The fundamental problem to which

all these cases address themselves, however, is whether the minor, possessing a privilege to avoid a given juridical act, exercised that privilege.
Some decisions state that the minor's act of ratification must take
the form of a promise,4 7 and it is clear that if the minor does make a

subsequent promise after coming of age, such a promise is enforceable
as a contract." But his power of avoidance may be lost in other ways
'Bresee v. Stanly, 119 N.C. 278, 25 S.E. 870 (1896) (conditional promise insufficient); Ward
v. Anderson, Ill N.C. 115, 15 S.E. 1033 (1892); Dunlap v. Hales, 47 N.C. 381 (1855) (acknowledgment of debt insufficient); Armfield v. Tate, 29 N.C. 258 (1847) (express promise sufficient); Hoyle
v. Stowe, 19 N.C. 320 (1837) (acknowledgment insufficient); Alexander v. Hutchinson, 12 N.C.
13 (1826) (implied-in-fact promise sufficient).
"Pippen v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 130 N.C. 23, 25, 40 S.E. 822, 823 (1902) (executory
contract relating to personalty may be avoided); State ex rel. Petty v. Rousseau, 94 N.C. 355, 361
(1886) (if executed, acknowledgement is sufficient ratification and no new promise of consideration
is necessary).
I Skinner v. Maxwell, 66 N.C. 45, 47 (1872).
16
Baggett v. Johnson, 160 N.C. 26, 31-32, 76 S.E. 86, 88 (1912) (inaction operates as ratification); Weeks v. Wilkins, 134 N.C. 516,47 S.E. 24 (1904) (delay is affirmance); Gaylord v. Respass,
92 N.C. 553, 557 (1885) (infant must act to repudiate conveyance at majority or assent assumed);
Caffey v. McMichael, 64 N.C. 508 (1870) (act of ownership after reaching majority is ratification
of credit purchase); McCormic v. Leggett, 53 N.C. 425 (1862) (accepting payment is affirmance).
"State ex rel. Petty v. Rousseau, 94 N.C. 355 (1886) (ratification of an executory contract
requires an express promise); Armfield v. Tate, 29 N.C. 258 (1847); cf.Boyle v. Stowe, 19 N.C.
320 (1837) (mere acknowledgement not enough, must be express promise).
"Armfield v. Tate, 29 N.C. 258 (1847); Alexander v. Hutchinson, 12 N.C. 13 (1826);
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 89 (1932).
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as well. Mere delay may be enough;49 the retention of benefits conferred
on the minor may be sufficient; ° and the acknowledgement and expression of a desire to ratify an earlier deed, written on the same piece of
paper, has been held sufficient.5 1 Remaining in possession and making
a part payment, or, if the minor were the grantor, receiving payment
after attaining full age is also sufficient to destroy the privilege of avoidance.5 2 In conveyancing cases the minor has a reasonable length of time
after he reaches full age in which to disaffirm, and, by analogy to a
statute giving him three years in which to bring an action "against a
disseissor," three years is said to be reasonable. Conversely, a delay of
more than three years constitutes an affirmance. This is true even
though the minor may have no cause of action concerning the land
because a life estate intervenes and his interest turns on the death of the
life tenant. The three-year period is measured from the date of his
majority-not from the date of accrual of his cause of action 3 The
same rule has been applied to a contract to buy land, as distinguished
54
from the conveyance itself
A similar panoply of events triggers the minor's privilege of avoidance. For example, he may disaffirm by bringing a lawsuit that contradicts his earlier acts while a minor. 5 In one interesting case the sale of
crops earlier mortgaged was said to be a clear disaffirmance of the
mortgage, and, therefore, the crime of disposing of mortgaged goods
had not been committed by the minor. A more common situation is
that of the second deed: A minor deeds property while a minor and then,
upon reaching full age, conveys to another. The second deed is a clear
act of disaffirmance-even as against an apparent bona fide purchaser
for value.57 A somewhat different twist was present in Pippen v. Mutual
Benefit Life Insurance Company,5 in which a minor paid several prem"'Baggett v. Jackson, 160 N.C. 26, 76 S.E. 86 (1912); Weeks v. Wilkins, 134 N.C. 516, 47

S.E. 24 (1904).
Caffey v. McMichael, 64 N.C. 507 (1870).
5t Murray v. Shanklin, 20 N.C. 289 (1839).
52

McCormic v. Leggett, 53 N.C. 425 (1862) (infant grant received payment); Dewey v. Bur-

bank, 77 N.C. 259 (1877).

Baggett v. Jackson, 160 N.C. 26, 76 S.E. 86 (1912); Weeks v. Wilkins, 134 N.C. 516, 47
S.E. 24 (1904)._
-Chandler v. Jones, 172 N.C. 569, 90 S.E. 580 (1916).
"Faircloth v. Johnson, 189 N.C. 429, 127 S.E. 346 (1925); see Millsaps v. Estes, 134 N.C.
486, 46 S.E. 988 (1904).
State v. Howard, 88 N.C. 651 (1883).
57
Gaskins v. Allen, 137 N.C. 426, 49 S.E. 919 (1905).
-130 N.C. 23, 40 S.E. 822 (1902).
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iums on a life insurance policy, then cancelled the policy, and then died.
His administrator claimed that the cancellation was voidable and sued
for the face amount of the policy. The court held that inasmuch as the
contract "was executory" and related to personalty, the contract could
be avoided by him during his infancy and that one way of so disaffirming was to enter into an agreement voluntarily annulling and cancelling
it. Once the minor had disaffirmed, the subsequent ratification was
ineffective.
The language in the cases concerning the distinctions between executory and executed transactions s9 and real and personal property appears to be oblique judicial recognition of the fact that in transactions
between adults and minors, the concepts of ratification and disaffirmance may help to achieve a just result. The privilege of avoidance may
terminate when it is unfair or unjust to permit the minor to exercise this
power. In Wright v. Hepler" a minor and his wife (also a minor) purchased land with a down payment, giving the seller a promissory note
and a mortgage. Upon both reaching majority, they borrowed money
from the minor's father and uncle and gave them a note and a second
mortgage. They then brought suit against the adult with whom they had
dealt, seeking the return of the down payment in exchange for the title
to the property that they had purchased-property now subject, of
course, to the valid deed and mortgage to the minor's father and uncle.
One quickly jumps to the conclusion that such action should not be
permitted, and the court agreed, holding that the mortgage to the father
and uncle was a ratification of the voidable contract of sale, even though
the minors were offering to return the consideration that they had received. This decision and others like it that require a minor to return
any consideration he has received6 ' or that treat the retention of value
by the minor after he attains majority as an act of ratification 62-a
"non-act" that effectively destroys his privilege of avoidance-also are
evidence of the courts' search for a way to validate a fair exchange in
transactions between adults and minors.
In considering whether the transaction is fair, the conduct of the
adult may also be weighed. In Dibble v. Jones3 a father whose minor
son owned land entered into negotiations with the plaintiffs to sell them
"See also State ex rel. Petty v. Rousseau, 94 N.C. 355, 361 (1886).
C194 N.C. 542, 140 S.E. 90 (1927).
"Poe v. Horne, 44 N.C. 398 (1853).
"Chandler v. Jones, 172 N.C. 569, 90 S.E. 580 (1916); State ex rel. Petty v. Rousseau, 94
N.C. 355 (1886); Caffey v. McMichael, 64 N.C. 507 (1870).
-58 N.C. 389 (1860).
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the land. The plaintiffs inquired as to the age of the boy and were
assured by the father that he was of full age. The father and son received
two buggies and a collection of promissory notes, in return for which
they signed a deed to the real property. The father than took the consideration and expended it in the operation of a grocery store. When the
buyers sought injunctive relief aimed at prohibiting the son from conveying the land to someone else after he had reached full age, the court
dismissed the bill. The doubt about the age of the boy and the fact that
the buyers consummated the deal despite that doubt seemed to the court
to be sharp dealing. The buyers, although they were on notice, chose to
run the risk on the integrity of the father. Since the minor received little
or no benefit from the transaction, he was permitted to disaffirm, and
the buyers were not entitled to any return of consideration from the
minor.
The lawyer with a problem that pertains to the exercise of this
privilege of avoidance should be aware of the fact that the recent North
Carolina legislation concerning minority also deals with the question of
ratification. The relevant section is set forth in its entirety in an appended footnote.64
THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE

The common law rule regarding a minor's basic incapacity to contract has been widely modified by statute. Pressure for such statutory
modification comes about when the rule concerning incapacity interferes with the certainty of transactions that are important because of
their economic value, their frequency, or a variety of other reasons,
including the level of "political clout" of those receiving the promises.
"For purposes of determining the applicability of the statute of limitations which
has been tolled because of minority or for purposes of determining the applicable period

of time for disaffirmance of a contract of a minor upon reaching majority, because of a
change in applicable law occasioned by enactment of this Chapter, Chapter 1231 of the
1971 Session Laws, the following rules shall apply:
(1) For those persons who were 21 on the effective date of applicable law,
limitations shall apply as they would prior to amendment;
(2) For those persons 18 years of age but not 21 on the effective date of

applicable law, any time periods for disaffirmance or application of the statute
of limitations shall run from the effective date of this Chapter, to wit, July 5,
1971.

(3) For those persons not yet 18, any time periods for disaffirmance or
application of the statute of limitations shall run from the person's reaching age
18.

N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 48A-3 (Supp. 1971).
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One notable example of this process is the California statute that prohibits a minor from disaffirming a contract to perform or render services as an actor or as a participatnt or player in professional sports when
such a contract has been approved by a trial court."5
In North Carolina a number of statutes alter in some manner the
common law rule. Some of the more important of these include section
31-1,66 which establishes the capacity of an eighteen-year-old to make a
will, and section 39-13.2,6? which validates certain transactions by married individuals below the age of eighteen. Under this latter section the
married minor is declared competent to execute jointly with his or her
spouse such contracts as are ordinarily required in the financing of the
purchase of real estate, but only if the other spouse is of age. Another
example is a statute that permits individuals who are otherwise classified
as minors to engage in such banking activities as the writing of checks
and the leasing of safe deposit boxes. 8 Analogous provisions exist with
respect to savings and loan associations except that the age is lowered
to twelve years!69 Similarly, a minor who is seventeen years of age has
full capacity to borrow money for educational purposes, so long as the
purposes do not encompass a correspondence course. 7 Other specific
examples of statutory modification of the common law rule with respect
to incapacity are appended in a footnote.7 Activity in this field by the
1971 North Carolina General Assembly has complicated an already
complex interrelationship of rules.
A typical response to the possible enactment of the twenty-sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution went something like this:
If they want to vote, then they ought to have the responsibility of an
adult as well. The initial result of this kind of thinking in North Carolina
was the passage of legislation that came to be known as chapter 585.71
This piece of legislative rule-making attempted to make every eighteenyear-old an adult. It contained only three sections. The first stated that
the common law definition of a minor, insofar as it pertained to age,
CAL. CIV. CODE §§
section, see Warner Bros.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §
67N.C. GEN. STAT. §

"N.C.

GEN. STAT.
STAT.

"N.C. GEN.
7
N.C.
71

36(2)-(3) (Supp. 1971). For a discussion of the constitutionality of this
Pictures, Inc. v. Brodel, 31 Cal. 2d 766, 192 P.2d 949 (1948).
31-1 (Supp. 1971).
39-13.2 (1966), as amended, (Supp. 1971).

§ 53-53 (1965).
§ 54-18 (1965).
§ 116-174.1 (Supp. 1971).

GEN. STAT.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-205.1 (Supp. 1971) (minors fifteen years and older have full power
and authority to make contracts of insurance and annuity); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 165-18 (Supp. 1971)

(minor spouses of veterans empowered to contract so as to gain certain veteran's benefits).
riCh. 585, [1971] N.C. Sess. L.

-.
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was repealed and that a minor shall now be any person who has not
attained the age of eighteen years. The second section repealed all laws
and clauses in laws in conflict with this new definition, and the third
section made the act effective "in the event the amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America 'providing that the right of
citizens who are eighteen years of age to vote shall not be denied or
abridged on account of age' is certified by the United States Administrator of General Services to have been ratified by the legislatures of at
least three-fourths of the States. 73 The North Carolina act was ratified
74
on June 17, 1971.
On July 5, 1971, Robert Kunzig, the Administrator of General
Services, did certify that the twenty-sixth amendment to the United
States Constitution had become valid and "to all intents and purposes"
a part of the Constitution.75 North Carolina's chapter 585, which had a
relatively easy passage through both legislative houses, received much
closer scrutiny between the date of its ratification and July 5. Attempts
were made to repeal it outright or to postpone its effective date. Although both of these attempts were unsuccessful, the scrutiny and criticism did result in the passage on July 21, 1971 of another, more technical bill, now chapter 1231 .7 This second piece of legislation amended
in one way or another more than seventy different sections of the North
CarolinaGeneral Statutes that dealt with chronological age as a determinant of juridical acts. In general terms it changed by amendment
process the particular sections in which the words or symbols "twentyone years" appeared and substituted therefor the words or symbols
"eighteen years."
However, what chapter 1231 did not change seems to be as important as what it did change. For example, chapter 1231 did not amend
those statutes that deal with the obligation of support of minor children.
Since chapter 585 has changed the common law definition of minor
from twenty-one years to eighteen years, it appears that the obligation
to support one's minor children now expires at their eighteenth birthday
instead of their twenty-first.77 Altogether more than two hundred sections of the North CarolinaGeneralStatutes may be affected by chapter
585.
3
1d.
74

§ 3.
1d.
1136 Fed. Reg. 12725 (1971).
"Ch. 1231, [1971] N.C. Sess. L.
nN.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(b) (Supp. 1971); Shoaf v. Shoaf, 14 N.C. App. 231, 188 S.E.2d
19 (1972); Crouch v. Crouch, 14 N.C. App. 49, 187 S.E.2d 348 (1972).
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Nevertheless, chapter 1231 did not amend all of the statutes that
utilized the words or symbols "twenty-one years." Thus, if a statute
contains the key language "twenty-one years" and chapter 1231 did not
amend it, the old rule continues. 78 For example, one of the statutes not
amended is the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, which limits the possession of "hard liquor" to those persons twenty-one years of age and
older.79 The same kind of legislative treatment affects complicated inheritance tax and gift tax provisions in North Carolina. Section 1054(b)8" of the North Carolina General Statutes gives each child of a
decedent who is "under 21 years of age" a five-thousand-dollar exemption. That section was not amended by chapter 1231 and presumably
continues in force as written. Similarly, a complex provision of the gift
tax law of North Carolina describes certain exclusions but bars any gift
of a future interest in property. The section then explains that for this
purpose a gift to a person who has not yet attained the age of twentyone years shall not be a gift of a future interest if certain other requirements not here relevant are established. 8' Since chapter 1231 did not
amend this statute, the rule remains.
There are also statutes in which an age other than twenty-one years
is utilized. Sometimes both a chronological age and the word "minor"
appear in conjunction, but in those cases the chronological age is always
less than eighteen years, so neither chapter 585 nor chapter 1231 alters
the situation. Examples of this kind of legislation include the law that
prohibits individuals more than sixteen years of age from wearing masks
on the public highways," and the law that defines a tramp as one who
is more than fourteen years of age, 83 assuming, of course, that the other
criteria of the definition are met.
The use of chronological age as a dividing line for purposes of
sovereign control is pervasive in our society. It is not limited solely to
capacity to contract or to convey. Indeed such matters are only a minor
7

Chapter 585 does not affect such a statutory rule because the word "minor" is not used in

the rule.

"N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 18A-3 (Supp. 1971) prohibits the manufacture, sale, transportation, or

possession of any intoxicating liquor. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18A-30 (Supp. 1971) permits persons
over twenty-one years of age to possess for lawful purposes alcoholic beverages. The two enactments construed together mean that persons under twenty-one years of age who possess "intoxicating liquors" are in violation of state law. See State v. Carpenter, 215 N.C. 635, 3 S.E.2d 34 (1939).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-4(b) (Supp. 1971).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-188(d) (1965). See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2503(c).

'N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§ 14-12.7 (1969). See also N.C.

id. § 116-174.1 (Supp. 1971).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-338 (1969).

GEN. STAT.

§§ 53-53, 54-18 (1965);
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part of the broad area of human behavior regulated in such a manner.
Such questions as the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts, welfare payments for dependent children, the age of consent for "virtuous girls,"
licensing statutes, election regulations, and many, many others have all
been affected in one way or another by chapters 585 and 1231. The
certainty of application and the ease of establishing such a fact as age
has great appeal to a lawmaker.
In terms of capacity to contract, the effect of chapter 585 and
chapter 1231 is simply to lower the age of majority to eighteen years
where there are no authorizing statutes fixing a lower age. This blunderbuss approach may have the practical effect of diminishing the number
of transactions that might be subject to the capacity controversy. Perhaps not as many seventeen-year-olds enter into contracts as do twentyyear-olds. The arbitrariness of the rule remains with us, however. The
married seventeen-year-old will still appear to be much older, will still
purchase cars, and will still attempt to sell property inherited from his
rich uncle.
The call for legislative-not judicial-action that was sounded in
the dissenting opinion in Rogers has received an answer, but not one
that redresses the present imbalance between the minor and the adult
who deals with him. The legislature did not provide that fairness and
justice should be the standards by which such exchanges are to be measured. Instead, the old rule continues at an earlier chronological point.
The tough, delicate responsibility of achieving justice on a case-by-case
basis still remains the glory of common law judges. Shirk this responsibility they may, but the people who give these judges their awesome
power will suffer as a result.
CAPACITY AND THE MENTALLY ILL

If one places alongside any of the infancy cases the facts and result
of Sprinkle v. Welborn84 and the flexibility of the capacity rule as it
pertains to the mentally incompetent, the arbitrariness of the
chronological-age rule as it pertains to infants becomes apparent. At the
time of the transaction in question, a jury found that Sprinkle was
mentally incompetent. She had deeded her land valued at four thousand
dollars in exchange for land, cattle, and other consideration of a total
value of thirteen hundred dollars. Her grantee was a neighbor who had
known her for years, and, while he had testified that he did not know
-140 N.C. 163, 52 S.E. 666 (1905).
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that she was insane, there was ample evidence introduced to support the
verdict of the jury otherwise. The grantee, having obtained legal title to
the property, sold it to Greenwood, a purchaser for value without notice.
In an action brought by Sprinkle's guardian against both the original
grantee and Greenwood, the action against Greenwood was dismissed.
The bona fide purchaser for value from the grantee who had dealt with
the incompetent was protected.
One further aspect of Sprinkle needs emphasis. The trial court's
holding that the grantee must restore to Sprinkle the difference between
the value of the land received and the value of the consideration given
was fully supported by the appellate court. In other words, the court
enforced what it considered to be a fair bargain-no more, no less.
Sprinkle is also important for its test of one's mental capacity to
contract. It is set forth at some length because of its learning on the
subject:
"1. The law fixes no particular standard of intelligence necessary to
be possessed by parties in making a contract, and although a person
may not have sufficient intelligence to manage his affairs in a proper
and prudent manner, still he may be capable of making a binding
contract. 2. It is not required that a person should be able to make a
disposition of his property with judgment and discretion. It is sufficient
if he understands what he is about. If a person knows what he is doing
and is aware of the nature of the particular transaction, such person

has sufficient mental capacity to make a contract, although that person
may not act wisely or discreetly, or make a good bargain.",,

On this particular point Gaskins v. Allen 6 provides an interesting
comparison with Sprinkle. In Gaskins the deed of a minor that had been
executed in 1871 was successfully disaffirmed more than two decades
later, thus voiding title to property that had resided in the defendant
bona fide purchasers for twenty years. The reason for such a result
flowed from the fact that although the female minor soon attained her
majority, she remained under the disability of coverture and could not
exercise her privilege of disaffirmance until that disability had been
removed.
The transfer of title by a minor is effective so far as bona fide
purchasers are concerned when the subject matter of the contract is
15Id. at 166-67, 52 S.E. at 667. The quoted material is from the instructions given by the court

on the issue of mental capacity.

-137 N.C. 426, 49 S.E. 919 (1905).
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personal property, a statute so provides, and the minor is attempting to
recover it. But the general rule remains that the minor may avoid his
promises when the written evidence thereof is in the hands of the bona
fide purchaser, although the ratification and necessaries concepts have
been utilized here also to protect the bona fide purchaser.88 In the law
of negotiable instruments, a minor may not disaffirm his transfer of title
by indorsement,89 but his incapacity as to his promise to pay may be
asserted against a holder in due course. 0 The opposite is the case where
the incapacity asserted by the promisor on the negotiable instrument is
that of mental illness. A holder in due course takes free of such a
defense."
The concepts of necessaries, disaffirmance, and ratification are
available for one wrestling with the problems that grow from the fact
that sane people contract with those who are mentally ill. However,
because of the greater flexibility of the doctrinal rules in this area, there
is not as great a need to utilize such devices in order to achieve a
balanced result. Consequently, the use of these concepts in cases involving the contractual liability of the mentally ill does not appear with the
frequency that it appears in the infancy cases. Nevertheless, the verbal
framework of the balancing act that courts must perform when resolving such issues is worth considering. The following passage represents
a typical judicial statement of the doctrine concerning mental illness:
A contract entered into by a person who is mentally incompetent
is voidable and not void. . . . At the election of the incompetent and
upon the return of the consideration and the restoration of the status
quo, it will be annulled by a court of equity.
Under certain conditions such a contract may be avoided by the
incompetent even when he is unable to place the other party to the
contract in statu quo, but the greater weight of authority supports the
rule that where a contract with an insane person has been entered into
in good faith, without fraud or imposition, for a fair consideration, of
which the incompetent has received the benefit, without notice of the
"Jones v. Caldwell, 276 Ark. 260, 225 S.W.2d 323 (1 94 ) (UNIFORM

SALES

AcT § 24 changed

common law rule); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-403 (1965); cf. Jackson v. Beard, 162 N.C. 105, 78
S.E. 6 (1913) (real property).
BsBancredit, Inc. v. Bethea, 65 N.J. Super. 538, 168 A.2d 250 (App. Div. 1961) (infancy is
real defense against holder in due course of promissory note given as part of purchase price of car
if car is not a necessary).

"N.C.
10N.C.

GEN. STAT.
GEN. STAT.

§ 25-3-207(l)(a) (1965).
§ 25-3-305(2)(a) (1965).

"Wadford v. Gillette, 193 N.C. 413, 137 S.E. 314 (1927); N.C.
(1965); see Odom v. Riddick, 104 N.C. 515, 10 S.E. 609 (1889).

GEN. STAT.

§ 25-3-305(2)(b)
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infirmity, and before an adjucation of insanity, and has been executed
in whole or in part, it will not be set aside unless the parties can be
restored to their original position ....
Thus, in an action to rescind.

. .

the plaintiff must show insanity

or mental incompetency at the time the contract was entered into.
Upon such showing the contract will be annulled unless it is made to
appear-the burden being on the defendant-that the defendant (1)
was ignorant of the mental incapacity; (2) had no notice thereof such
as would put a reasonably prudent person upon inquiry; (3) paid a fair
and full consideration; (4) took no unfair advantage of plaintiff; and
(5) that the plaintiff has not restored and is not able to restore the
consideration or to make adequate compensation therefor ...
Upon such a showing by the defendant any inference of fraud or2
undue advantage is rebutted and a court of equity will not intervene.
The case from which the above statement is taken is intriguing
because it illustrates in a fairly definite manner how a court may view
a contractual exchange and decide that it is not a fair transaction. The
mentally incompetent plaintiff had exchanged his fishing boat, which
was worth about 250 dollars, and 500 dollars in cash for the defendant's
fishing boat, which was worth about 400 dollars. The trial court dismissed the action, but the supreme court reversed, ruling that the defendant had not carried his burden of proof on the issue of fair and full
consideration.9 3 The defendant had failed to show that no unfair advantage had been taken of the plaintiff. Therefore, the plaintiff was entitled
to rescind and to recover damages. Here is judicial proof that North
Carolina courts have considered price variations-the inadequacy of
consideration-in reaching a decision that a contractual promise, otherwise binding, ought not to be enforced for reasons of justice. In a
broader context it can be invoked as authority for the proposition that
there is no barrier to a court's finding contracts unconscionable because
of price variations.94
The party seeking to exercise the privilege of avoidance has the
burden of proof on the question of whether he is or was mentally ill;
soundness of mind is the normal condition, and everyone is presumed

9'Carawan v. Clark, 219 N.C. 214, 216-17, 13 S.E.2d 237, 238 (1941).

'ld. at 217, 13 S.E.2d at 239.
"See Kugler v. Romain, 9 UCC REP. SERV. 559 (N.J. June 28, 1971) (exorbitant price fixed

by seller for consumer unconscionable and permits state to obtain injunctive relief); Jones v. Star
Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (exorbitant price charged
consumer ground for reformation).
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to be sane until the contrary appears." Until quite recently there has

been little or no analysis concerning the nature and extent of such
mental illness. In most of the North Carolina cases, this "fact" is provided for the appellate court by a jury finding." In such cases the test
of a person's competence is phrased in cognitive terms: Does he know
what he is about; does he understand the nature of the act in which he
engaged and its consequences?" Lay persons may testify as to their
observations and give their opinion concerning the alleged competency
of the person in question, and expert witnesses are also utilized for this
purpose. 8 The commitment or the appointment of a guardian presumes
"insanity," and such a presumption continues until it is shown that
sanity has been restored.9
In recent years the emotional aspect of the human personality has
been emphasized to a greater degree, and this emphasis has been mirrored in judicial and legal materials. Section 18C of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts has added an emotive or affective element to the
traditional cognitive statement of the rule.' Under this new formulation, recently quoted with approval by the New York Court of Appeals,
a person incurs only voidable contractual liability if, by reason of a
mental illness or defect, he is unable to understand in a reasonable
'5Carland v. Allison, 221 N.C. 120, 19 S.E.2d 245 (1942); D. STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA
EVIDENCE § 238 (2d ed. 1963).
"A typical set of issues is found in Chesson v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 268 N.C. 98, 101, 150 S.E.2d
40, 43 (1966).
'nHendricks v. Hendricks, 272 N.C. 340, 158 S.E.2d 496 (1968) (capacity to convey); Carland
v. Allison, 221 N.C. 120, 19 S.E.2d 245 (1942) (same); Burch v. Scott, 168 N.C. 602, 84 S.E. 1035
(1915) (capacity to contract); Sprinkle v. Welborn, 140 N.C. 163, 52 S.E. 666 (1905) (capacity to
convey); Morris v. Osborne, 104 N.C. 609, 10 S.E. 476 (1889) (capacity to contract); cf.Odom v.
Riddick, 104 N.C. 515, 10 S.E. 609 (1890).
"Cf. Chesson v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 268 N.C. 98, 150 S.E.2d 40 (1966); D. STANSBURY, NORTH
CAROLINA EVIDENCE §

127 (2d ed. 1963).

"9Medical College v. Maynard, 236 N.C. 506, 73 S.E.2d 315 (1952); Tomlins v. Cranford, 227
N.C. 323, 42 S.E.2d 100 (1947).
100(l) A person incurs only voidable contractual duties by entering into a transaction
if by reason of mental illness or defect
(a) he is unable to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and
consequences of the transaction, or
(b) he is unable to act in a reasonable manner in relation to the tranaction
and the other party has reason to know of his condition.
(2) Where the contract is made on fair terms and the other party is without
knowledge of the mental illness or defect, the power of avoidance under subsection (l)
terminates to the extent that the contract has been so performed in whole or in part or
the circumstances have so changed that avoidance would be inequitable. In such a case
a court may grant relief on such equitable terms as the situation requires.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18C (Tent. Draft No. i, 1964).
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manner the nature and consequences of the transaction (the traditional
cognitive test) or, although he may understand the transaction, is unable
to act in a reasonable manner in relation to the transaction. 01 Such a
justification has not yet appeared verbally in the North Carolina cases,
but as early as 1954 a mental illness that reflects the distinction-a
"manic-depressive psychosis"-served as grounds of the trial court's
01 2
avoidance of a separation agreement.
Intoxication has also been treated as a form of mental illness for
the purpose of permitting avoidance of contractual duties incurred while
under the influence of alcohol or drugs. A contract made by a person
who was intoxicated at the time of execution is voidable under circumstances similar to the contract of a mentally ill person."' 3 Moreover, a
person may be mentally ill as a result of chronic alcoholism, although
he was not actually intoxicated at the time he entered into the contractual relationship.0 4
MOORE AND CHESSON:

Two

RECENT APPLICATIONS

In Moore v. New York Life Insurance Co.," 5 the executrix of the
estate of the insured decedent sought to set aside a cash-surrender-value
transaction that the insured had executed with the company only three
days before he was committed to a hospital. In the language of the
opinion, the insured's drinking habits had grown progressively worse for
ten years, and, in the opinion of the plaintiffs witnesses, he was "off
his rocker," irrational, and despondent. However, the insured's sister,
testifying for the insurance company, said that in her opinion he was
mentally competent at the time of the transaction and had sufficient
capacity to understand the nature of what he was doing. The decedent
also appeared normal to the agent who had transacted business with him
for several years. Shortly after the insured's committment to the hospital, his wife received the check representing the cash surrender value and
(by her attorney) returned it to the company and, when her husband
passed away shortly thereafter, demanded the death benefit for the
0

° Ortelere v. Teacher's Retirement Bd., 25 N.Y.2d 196, 250 N.E.2d 450, 303 N:Y.S.2d 362
(1969).
"'Lawson v. Bennett, 240 N.C. 52, 81 S.E.2d 1962 (1954).
" Chesson v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 268 N.C. 98, 150 S.E.2d 40 (1966); Moore v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 440, 146 S.E.2d 492 (1966); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18D
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964); see Burch v. Scott, 168 N.C. 602, 84 S.E. 1035 (1915).
"'See authorities cited note 103 supra.
1-266 N.C. 440, 146 S.E.2d 492 (1966).
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estate. As part of the cash-surrender transaction, the insured decedent
had also changed the designated beneficiary of the policy from his wife
to his estate. The widow, suing as executrix of the estate, ratified the
act of the incompetent in changing the beneficiary from the wife to the
estate but avoided the act of the incompetent in cancelling the policy.
Both acts probably occurred not more than a day apart.
In Chesson v. Pilot Life Insurance Co.,"0 6 the transaction in question took place after the alleged incompetent had been released from a
mental hospital as in need of no further treatment. When he returned
home, he dug out of a dresser drawer a life insurance policy on his own
life and headed for the home office of the company, a trip of nearly five
hours by automobile. He had borrowed against the policy earlier and
now wished to cash it in for its present worth, twenty-five dollars. The
insurance company executive with whom he had talked had pointed out
that if he waited one month longer he would receive an additional thirtytwo-dollar dividend. Nevertheless, the insured ignored the advice, obtained the money, and then disappeared for nearly three weeks. When
he finally returned home, he was in such a condition that his wife sought
police protection from him. In jail, awaiting transfer to a hospital, the
insured suddenly jumped backward, fell against a concrete floor, and
died. In her lawsuit against the insurance company for the death benefit
of the life insurance policy, the wife as administratrix of the decedent's
estate was successful in avoiding the cancellation on grounds of incapacity.
Moore and Chesson illustrate several important points. First, proof
of commitment plays a significant role as evidence of the incompetency.
In many cases, however, it is only that-evidence. It is not conclusive,
not even for transactions made by the person while he is in the custody
of the hospital. Only when there is a formal adjudication of insanity
under the appropriate statutory proceedings can one say that commitment renders the contracts of the mentally ill a nullity in the same way
that they are a nullity when a guardian has been appointed. Even then,
it is only a presumption, and the passage of time may restore the capacity. ' 7 In Chesson a psychiatrist testified that the alleged incompetent
was actually listed as a patient on the rolls of the mental hospital at the
time of the transaction with the insurance company. He was a "temporary visit" patient, sent home for a week with the understanding that if
106268 N.C. 98, 150 S.E.2d 40 (1966).
"°'De jure restoration of rights is a somewhat complex process. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-4
to -5 (1966), as amended, (Supp. 1971).

CONTRACTS OF MINORS

1972]

he did not return, he would be discharged (as he was in fact three days
after the cancellation transaction). The purpose of such an administrative procedure is a simple one. If, after a week at home, it seems that
the mentally ill person needs further treatment, he may simply return
to the hospital without the necessity of repeating the elaborate commitment procedures.'
Secondly, while the privilege of avoidance is often said to be personal to the individual, in these two cases the personal representatives
of the decedent incompetents exercised the privilege, and in other cases
heirs of the individual with the privilege have been allowed to exercise
it. '° The same logic applies in the infancy cases."'
Moore and Chesson are also examples of the breadth of the evidentiary range with respect to the issue of competency. There were many
witnesses-wives, sisters, maids, ministers, and casual acquaintances-all of whom testified as to the acts and mental state of the
alleged incompetent.
Actually, the only evidence of notice of incompetency residing in
the insurance company concerning Chesson's mental illness was the fact
that while his home was in Belhaven, he drove to Greensboro and presented himself to the executive in charge of policy cancellations at the
home office, which is located in a rural part of the community. However, Chesson was neatly dressed at the time, and the executive testified
that he had no reason to suspect the insured's incompetency. But since
the company bore the burden of proof on the issue of lack of notice, a
jury finding for the plaintiff was undisturbed. In Moore the notice element of the case was not discussed.
THE ROLE OF NOTICE OF INCOMPETENCY

The role of notice or knowledge of the infirmity in the party dealing
with one who is mentally ill plays a part in these cases that cannot be
equated to anything in the infancy cases. Whether or not the person
knew that he was dealing with an infant seems irrelevant. However, such
knowledge can be extremely important in dealing with one who is mentally ill. In its absence the party asserting the privilege of avoidance may
1 05

Record at 32, Chesson v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 268 N.C. 98, 150 S.E.2d

40

(1966).

'0 Walker v. McLaurin, 227 N.C. 53, 40 S.E.2d 455 (1946); Creekmore v. Baxter, 121 N.C.
31, 27 S.E. 994 (1897).
IlPippen v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 130 N.C. 23, 40 S.E. 822 (1902). But cf Reynolds
v. Earley, 241 N.C. 521, 85 S.E.2d 994 (1955), in which an owner of land was unsuccessful in his
attempt to assert the incapacity of the option holder who had assigned his option to another.
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find that he cannot do so if the contract has been at least partially
performed."' There is authority for the proposition that the completely
executory contract may be avoided by the incompetent in any event."'
On the other hand, when the party knows that he is dealing with an
incompetent, he may find himself in a worse position than if he had not
entered into the contract at all. An attempt to restore the status quo may
be undertaken, but if it cannot occur the incompetent may still be able
to rescind the contract if such knowledge was present."' One who
knowingly deals with an incompetent assumes the risk of such dealings.
In this context one can compare Wadford v. Gillette,"' in which a
rescission of a deed of trust and promissory note was denied the incompetent because the party dealing with her did so in good faith and
without knowledge of her disability, with Creekmore v. Baxter,"' in
which recovery of land was allowed because the mortgagee who eventually obtained the land knew of the incompetency of the party with whom
he had dealt.
Creekmore also illustrates another utility of the concept of notice.
The jury found that the mortgagee knew of the incompetent's incapacity, but was directed by the court to find that he practiced no actual
fraud on the plaintiff. Thus, one can set aside the traditional contractdestroying devices of fraud, undue influence, and duress. While these
concepts are perfectly legitimate and are long-tested devices for overcoming otherwise valid promises, their technical requirements need not
be established in capacity cases. True, there is often overlap, particularly in the weakness-of-mind cases, but once mental incompetence has
been established and the other party has failed to establish lack of
notice, the technical tests of fraud, undue influence, and duress are not
required to be met." ' The notice itself serves as fraud in law, and fraud
in fact is not needed.1 7 The party dealing with knowledge of the other
party's incompetency is "deemed to have perpetrated a meditated
"'Odum v. Riddick, 104 N.C. 515, 10 S.E. 609 (1889); Riggin v. Green, 80 N.C. 236 (1879);
Carr v. Holliday, 21 N.C. 344 (1836).
"2RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18C(1) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964).
"'Creekmore v. Baxter, 121 N.C. 31, 27 S.E. 994 (1897).
114193 N.C.A13, 420, 137 S.E. 314, 317 (1927).
"'121 N.C. 31, 27 S.E. 994 (1897). See also Gilbert v. West, 211 N.C. 465, 190 S.E. 727
(1937); Godwin v. Parker, 152 N.C. 672, 68 S.E. 208 (1910); Reed v. Exum, 84 N.C. 430 (1880).
"'Daniel v. Dixon, 161 N.C. 377, 77 S.E. 305 (1913). See Green, Fraud, Undue Influence and
Mental Incompetency-A Study in Related Concepts, 43 CoLUM. L. REv. 176 (1943) for a comprehensive review of the authorities.
"'Creekmore v. Baxter, 121 N.C. 31, 27 S.E. 994 (1897).
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fraud" upon the incompetent." 8 The fraud, if any is necessary, may be
presumed from the fact of knowledge, or the knowledge may be deemed
to be fraud in law."' In either case that is all that is necessary.
Factually speaking, lawyers may have difficulty fitting a given factual situation into any of the categories, and they may continue to plead
any and all of such theories as would enable them to overcome the
contractual duty that is otherwise binding. This could be an additional
reason for urging the increased use of the concept of unconscionability.
All of these factual situations share a common thread. There is at least
an allegation that one who is in a superior position is attempting to
impose contractual liability upon one who is in an inferior position. In
such cases, however, the courts should look to the fairness of the exchange.'20 The doctrines by which the courts measure unconscionability,
while as yet undeveloped, may well lead to a percipient examination of
those factors that are now haphazardly scattered among the many labels
of fraud, undue influence, weakness of mind, and duress. Professor
Green has already suggested that "[a]nother standard, although for the
most part inarticulate, is the standard of the fairness or the unfairness
of the transaction."''2 Once notice has been established, whether to
permit avoidance on grounds of mental incompetency becomes a relatively simple question. In short, the power of avoidance in the incompetent may be terminated by partial or complete performance if the contract was made on fair terms and the other party had no notice of the
122
mental illness.
ARGUMENTS FOR A FAIRNESS PERSPECTIVE

The arguments that the contracts of minors-particularly older
minors, since they are usually the ones involved in the lawsuits that
reach the appellate level-ought to be measured in terms of fairness,
rather than by the arbitrary rule of age, has more appeal when the age
of minority remains at twenty-one years. Obviously the twenty-year-old
married student in Gastonia Personnel Corp. v. Rogers'2 appeared to
"'Godwin v. Parker, 152 N.C. 672, 675, 68 S.E. 208, 209 (1910); Creekmore v. Baxter, 121
N.C. 31, 33, 27 S.E. 994, 995 (1897).
"'See authorities cited note 118 supra.
120See Riggan v. Green, 80 N.C. 236 (1879).
"'Green, Proofof Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major Premise, 53 YALE L.J.
271,311 (1944).
2RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18C(2) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964).
"276 N.C. 279, 172 S.E.2d 19 (1970).
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have the requisite ability to enter into the transaction, and it seems
unjust to permit him to avoid the resultant liability.
North Carolina and at least five other states have by statute lowered the age of minority to eighteen years,'24 and in those jurisdictions
the ease of application and the certainty of result that always make an
arbitrary rule attractive tend to support the continued application of the
old rule at the lower age level. Nevertheless, the reality remains that
sixteen and seventeen-year-olds will continue to enter into contractual
relationships. In a jurisdiction like North Carolina where the common
law rule has been applied so vigorously in favor of the minor, the argument that these transactions ought to be measured in terms of fairness
has somewhat more weight than it might have in a jurisdiction that has
developed devices such as a requirement that the consideration be returned before the minor may exercise his privilege of avoidance or a
provision that gives a remedy for the minor's misrepresentation. But
even there it seems less cluttered to speak of fairness and balance.
Indeed, an argument can be made that age should be disregarded altogether and a system of presumptions, similar to those applied in the law
of negligence, be adopted.2 5 For example, by statute persons under the
age of sixteen could be deemed incapable of contracting and have the
privilege of disaffirmance as minors do now. Persons sixteen to twentyone years of age could be presumed incapable of contracting, but the
presumption could be rebutted by the adult's establishing capacity in
fact.
I would suggest the age of fourteen as the line at which the benefits
of certainty and ease of application clearly overshadow the need for
discretionary justice in these factual situations. That is, the present rules
would govern contracts of those younger than fourteen years; those
minors who were fourteen and older would be treated in the same manner as adults, but within a broadened application of the doctrine of
unconscionability as explained later.
Historically, there is some evidence that fourteen was the age in
Roman law at which at least a limited capacity to contract emerged.,
Selection of twenty-one years as the crucial time was apparently related
REV. STAT. ANN. § 2.015 (1970); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-13-1 (Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN.
48A-1, -2 (Supp. 1971); TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-648 (1971); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 173
(1971); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.010 (1970).
'Note, Infants' Contractual Disabilities: Do Modern Sociological and Economic Trends
Demand a Change in the Law?, 41 IND. L.J. 140 (1965).
2
' Id. at 143.

'Ky.

STAT.

§§
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to the muscular development of young men in the middle ages, for at
that age they could carry armor and become knights.'2 As recently as
1811, males of the age of fourteen and females of the age of twelve had
the legal ability to engage in at least one juridical act in North Carolina,
that of willing their personal property. 28 And at the age of twelve a
minor is by statute at the present time authorized to deal in the shares
of Savings and Loan Associations." 9 At the age of fourteen a person
apparently has the requisite mental ability to formulate a criminal intent-a necessary ingredient of some of the crimes in our state. 131 And
3
a fourteen-year old seems perfectly capable of committing a tort. '
Within the same volume that reports Gastonia Personnel Corp. v.
Rogers,'31 the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized that since a
seventeen-year-old girl had the capacity to commit first degree murder,
she was also perfectly capable of waiving the presence of counsel and
of making a voluntary confession. 33 Why should she not have been
able to contract as well?
The change in the rule with respect to the capacity of minors to
contract and convey here advocated (drawing the line at age fourteen
could be altered by the enactment of a statute similar to chapter 585 of
the 1971 Session Laws, 31 which would substitute the age of fourteen
for the age of eighteen (in that enactment) and which would add a
paragraph limiting such a rule to contractual and conveyancing situations. The rule could also be changed by decision of the North Carolina
Supreme Court as occurred with respect to the concept of necessaries
in Gastonia Personnel Corp. v. Rogers.13. Since the capacity rule is a
creation of the courts, it could be revised by the courts. That a common
law court can make a mistake but cannot correct it does not seem to
be a satisfactory working rule in all circumstances.

1nJames, The Age of Majority, 4 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 22, 26 (1960).
ml N. WIGGINS, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN NORTH CAROLINA § 39 (1964).

121N.C. GEN. STAT. § 54-18 (1965).
reState v. Rogers, 275 N.C. 411, 168 S.E.2d 345 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1024 (1970);
State v. Burnett, 179 N.C. 735, 102 S.E. 711 (1920) (dictum).
'Cf Welch v. Jenkins, 271 N.C. 138, 155 S.E.2d 763 (1967) (fourteen-year-old capable of
contributory negligence).
132276 N.C. 279, 172 S.E.2d 19 (1970).
"'State v. Hill, 276 N.C. 1, 14, 170 S.E.2d 885, 894 (1969), rev'd mein. on other grounds,
403 U.S. 948 (1971).
134Ch. 585, [1971] N.C. Sess. L. _,
codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 48A-1, -2 (Supp. 1971).
1-276 N.C. 279, 172 S.E.2d 19 (1970).
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THE USE OF THE UNCONSCIONABILITY DOCTRINE

The problem of imposition by the superior upon one susceptible to
such imposition received further treatment by the 1971 session of
the North Carolina General Assembly. The 1967 legislature refused to
enact article 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code-the unconscionability section-when it adopted the Code that year. The 1971 legislature enacted not one but two separate unconscionability statutes. Chapter 1055 of the 1971 Session Laws 3 ' added to the original Code the
unconscionability section not adopted when the Code first passed
through the legislature. Chapter 796 of the 1971 Session Laws' included an unconscionability provision in the Retail Installment Sales
Act, importing the language of chapter 1055 and adding a definitional
sub-section in which the word "unconscionable" is defined to be "totally
unreasonable under all of the circumstances."' 38
These matters are relevant here because by lowering the age of
minority to eighteen (or to fourteen if my suggestion were adopted), the
possibility of imposition of contractual liability on those who have been
fleeced is naturally increased. Typical examples in North Carolina include college students and draftees at the many military bases within the
state, who seem particularly vulnerable to the tactics of sharp merchandisers. By lowering the age to eighteen, the possibilities for unconscionable practices are increased. It is, therefore, appropriate to point out that
the remedy of unconscionability is now available in North Carolina.
Some of the ingredients weighed by the judge in the determination of
unconscionability are the status, position, experience, and ability of the
party who is asserting the unconscionability. The age of the party asserting the need for avoidance of his contractual liability could be extremely
relevant. He might be an experienced businessman at the age of seventeen, or he might be experienced in the particular subject matter of the
contract. Similarly, it might be the type of contract situation in which
a young man or woman could naturally be expected to enter, such as a
contract for the delivery of newspapers. Under the unconscionability
label contained in chapter 1055 of the 1971 Session Laws,' 3' all of these
136Ch. 1055, § 1, [1971] N.C. Sess. L.._ codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-302 (Supp.
1971).
[-Ch. 796, § 1, [1971] N.C. Sess. L. ____ codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-43 (Supp.
1971).
1'9N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-43(c) (Supp. 1971).
'Ch. 1055, § 1, [1971] N.C. Sess. L. -,
codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-302 (Supp.
1971).
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considerations and more would be relevant. But there should be no
arbitrary, harsh application of a rule based on chronology that utilizes
such an unrealistic age as twenty-one or eighteen. Instead, the determination should be made by the trial judge upon consideration of the
commercial setting, the purpose and effect of the transaction, and the
status and experience of the individual. Such a conscious device for the
avoidance of contractual liability has clearly been needed in contract
law, and experience with the rules applying to the mentally ill indicate
by analogy how such a device might work. Its presence in our jurisprudence and its full utilization by the judges and lawyers of this state would
further support the basic argument that there is no great need to maintain an artificial barrier against contractual liability based solely upon
chronological age beyond fourteen years.

